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Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy was mainly a response to
the thought of the British Empiricists. He wanted to ground certain con
cepts and precepts that the British Empiricists had nearly destroyed. We
can say that the Copernican Revolution in philosophy addressed probems
with the ego, justice and the Good, and so on. The aspect of the Coperni
can Revolution with which I am concerned in this essay is Kant's view of
the necessityof cause and effect relationships. My concern in this essay is
to show that Kant is not committed to the problem of transcendental cau
sality. In short, some philosophers have claimed that Kant must be com
mitted to holding the following contradiction: There is no causal agency
known outside of the realm of categorial judgment, yet appearances must
becausedby thingsin themselves, whicharenotcategorially judged. Kant,
in one breath, states that judgements of cause and effect hold only of ap
pearances, while stating at other times that things in themselves must be
the cause of our appearances.
I will argue that Kant can escape this difficulty. In order to remove the
apparent contradiction, I will show that Kant can claim that things in them
selves need not be the cause of our appearances. Rather, they provide the
ground for appearances. Even though Kantdoes indeedsometimes speak
as though things in themselves should be the cause of appearances, it will
be shown that, ultimately,he is not committed to this language. Therefore,
Kant will not be committed to the contradiction.
First,I shouldlike to exposethe problem as it is in the Critique ofPure
Reason. Kant states in the Transcendental Deduction section of the Cri
tique ofPureReason: "All attempts to derive these pure concepts of the
understanding ['cause and effect' is a pure concept of the understanding]
from experience, and so to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin, are
entirely vain and useless."1 From where are thepureconcepts of the un
derstanding derived? Kant states, "...I maintain that the categories...are
1Immanuel Kant. Critique ofPure Reason. A112.
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nothing buttheconditions of thought ina possible experience just as space
andtimearetheconditions of intuition for thatsameexperience. Theyare
fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appear
ances [my italics]."2
As has already been established in the Critique of Pure Reason, the
human subject is given appearances andappearances only. "...Thething in
itself...is not known, andcannotbe known...and in experience no question
is ever asked in regard to it."3 It is the case that persons are not free to
condition the things in themselves with the pure intuitions of space and
time. Rather,the person receives objects in space and time because this is
just the way in which the manifold is always presented to the human sub
ject. Persons areonly privy toappearances. They arenotprivy to thething
in itself. Now, to derive any knowledge about appearances, persons must
make synthetic judgments. The very condition of knowledge about ap
pearances can only come about by way of the synthetic judgment.
In addition to this, Kant asserted that the thing in itself cannot be the
objectof experience. Onlyappearances arejudgedsynthetically. Once the
thing in itself is made present to the human subject, it is no longer the thing
in itself. It is an appearance, becauseit is givenin space and time. Appear
ances come with extension,and they come in time. This spatio-temporal
ordering cannot be known of the thing in itself.
Two places we may examine in order to expose the Kantian notion of
synthetic judgment are the Transcendental Analytic and the Second Anal
ogy of Experience.
We begin with the Transcendental Analytic. At A77, Kant states,
"Space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intu
ition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity
of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive
representations of objects, and, which therefore must also
always affect the concept of these objects. But if this mani
fold is to be known,the spontaneity of our thoughtrequires
that it be gone through in a certain way,taken up, and con
nected. This act I name synthesis."4
2 Ibid., Al 11.
3lbid.,A30.
4 Ibid., A77.
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There is a great amount of importance in this one statement. First, we
consider that the human subject is presented with a manifold. The mani
fold can be seen as having in itself nothing in the way of knowledge to
offer to the human subject. Once presented with the manifold, the human
subject spontaneously 'takes up' the manifold. In this 'taking up', there is
then made connections. Kant seems to be saying that connection per se
comes from the human subject. This follows because the manifold is with
out connection. Kant later mentions affinity, of course. However, this
affinity does seem quite different from actual connection.
Now, the human being engages in synthesis. In regard to synthesis,
Kant states, "Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere
result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of
the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever...."5
There can be no knowledge without synthesis. The human subject is
presented with the manifold at first. While present to the manifold and to
only the manifold, the personis completely devoid ofknowledge. Ofcourse,
at this point the appearances that are given by the manifold are not without
condition. The human subject is conditioning the appearances with the
pureintuitionsof spaceandtime. So, in the manifold there is still no knowl
edge, but the appearancescome to us in some temporal order. The appear
ances follow one another in time, or they arise at the same time. Further
more, the appearances always come extended. This is the function of the
pure intuition of space.
Persons are privileged to the appearances, and persons make synthetic
judgments about the appearances. The synthetic judgment of 'cause and
effect' is one such judgment. It is in the third set of categories that we find
the category called 'Of Causality and Dependence {cause and effect)\
Kant's placement of the notion of cause and effect directly here in the cat
egories leads us to believe that judgments of cause and effect must, as a
rule, be seen by Kant to be purely phenomenal. This follows from the fact
that the phenomenal realm is the realm in which knowledge is adherent.
So, we anticipate that Kant will indeed explicitly state that knowledge of
cause and effect is a function of human synthesis.
Our anticipation is justified in the Second Analogy of Experience. At
the outset of the Second Analogy, Kant states:
5 Ibid., A78.
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"I perceive that appearances follow one another, that is,
that there is a state of things atonetime the opposite of
which was in the preceding time. Thus I am really con
necting two perceptions in time. Now connection is not
thework of mere sense and intuition, butis here theprod
uctofasyntheticfaculty of imagination, whichdetermines
inner sense in respect of time-relation.6
As we know from thediscussion of thecategories, when Kant here claims
that connection is the product of the synthetic faculty of imagination, we
know that this means that the very act ofconnection itself isthe product of
the human subject. The connection is not adherent in the transcendental
object.
Kant voices his concern over the fact that connection strictly isaprod
uctof the synthetic faculty of imagination:
"But imagination can connect these two states intwo ways,
so that either the one or the other precedes in time. For
time cannot be perceived initself, and what precedes and
what follows cannot, therefore, by relation to it, be em
pirically determined in the object. Iam conscious only that
my imagination sets the one state before and the other af
ter, not that the one state precedes the other in the object.
In other words, the objective relation of appearances that
follow upon one another is not to be determined through
mere perception. In order that this relation be known as
determined, the relation between the two states must be so
thought that it is thereby determined as necessary which
of them must be placed before, and which of them after,
and that they cannot be placedin the reverse relation. But
the concept which carries with it a necessity of synthetic
unity can only be a pure concept that lies in the under
standing, not in perception; and in this case it is the con
cept of the relation of cause and effect"7
6Ibid.,B233.
7 Ibid., B233-B234
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Kant is concerned with how it is possible for the human subject to synthe
size causal judgments in the world correctly. This is obvious from the fact
that Kant claims that time is a product of the pure intuition. Because, if
time is a product of the pure intuition, then it could bepossible that persons
could make judgments about phenomenal objects that do not correspond to
how the noumenal objects truly are. To wit, the human subject is always
intuiting time relations of succession. So, how do we know that our judg
ments of time succession correspond to the way things really are?
The answer is that the experience that we humans have that is synthetic
must somehow have, as its ground, the thing in itself. As Wayne Waxman
states, "If any objective necessity at all is to be salvaged for the temporal
order of representations, it can only be through relation to the thing in it
self."8 Of course, this objective necessity of the temporal order of repre
sentations is extremely problematic. We cannot know anything about the
noumenal realm at all. The very derivation of this objective necessity is
what Kant is looking for in the SecondAnalogy, and any further discussion
of this particular problem is certainly beyond the scope of this paper.
There are moments when Kant seems to ascribe the same type ofcause
and effect judgments to the things in themselves that he ascribes to the
appearances. I assert that the reason for this is that Kant is trying to give
the appearance some sort of ground in the thing in itself. We find in Sec
tion 6 of the Antinomy of Pure Reason,
"...To say that [objects of the senses] exist prior to all my
experience is only to assert that they are to be met with if,
starting from perception, I advance to that part of experi
ence to which they belong. The cause of empirical condi
tions of this advance...is transcendental, and is therefore
necessarily unknown to me."9
Here, Kant is forwarding two important points. First, we find Kant claim
ing that there is, in fact, transcendental causality. Second, Kant clearly
claims that whatever it is which is in the realm of the transcendental is not
knowable.
8Wayne Waxman. "Kant's Analogies." The Review of Metaphysics. Sept. 1993,
Vol. 47, No. 1.
9lbid.,A496.
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In the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection we find, "Understand
ing... does...think for itselfan object in itself, but only as transcendental
object, which is the cause of appearance and therefore not itself appear
ance...."!0 The transcendental object seems to havean affect on the 'fac
ulty of knowledge' and the 'understanding'. However, cause and effect
relationships can never be known in the transcendental. Transcendental
matters can only be thought. The Kantian claim will be that 'cause and
effect' isa function ofsynthesis. 'Cause and effect' has itsplace insofar as
pertaining to how the understanding synthesizes phenomenal objects.
This is where the apparent contradiction arises. Kant claims at one
time that the appearance is the only object that can betaken bythe human
subject for synthesis by way of the categories. In summary, persons are
given appearances. The appearances come inspace and time, because the
understanding can only have objects inspace and time. The human subject
isnot free to experience things apart from space and time. Synthetic judg
ments are always ofappearances. When Kant speaks ofa known cause by
the transcendental object, theapparent contradiction is this: Kantseemsto
say that the Kant knows that the transcendental is the cause ofthe appear
ance. However, 'cause and effect' must be, asa rule, a synthetic judgment
made of the appearance.
We now move to the criticism of Kant putforward byPeter Strawson
inThe Bounds ofSense. Strawson's project is toexpose an incoherence in
Kantian philosophy regarding causality, and we shall follow his line of
argumentation through the relevant sections of Strawson's book.
First, Strawson neatly summarizes the whole ofKant's position on ap
pearances and things in themselves.
"Knowledge through perception of things existing inde
pendently of perception, as they are in themselves, is im
possible. For theonly perceptions which couldyieldus
any knowledge at all of such things must be the outcome
of being affected by those things; andfor thisreason such
knowledge canbe knowledge only of those things as they
appear...andnot of those things as they really are or are in
themselves."11
10Ibid.,A288.
11 Peter Strawson. The Bounds ofSense, p.250.
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This is a fine summation of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction on the
whole. However, I would like to make one point. It seems that Strawson is
blatantly setting the Kantian position in such a way as to attack it. I point
to the fact that Strawson uses the term 'affects' in regard to the agency that
the thing in itself has toward the phenomenon. For the purposes of my
essay, we must allow that Kant is not condemned, yet, to this language.
The Kantian doctrine, on the whole, may still find a way to elude the need
to use such causal terms in regard to the relationship between noumena and
phenomena. We find the problem already in hand with Strawson, but, nev
ertheless, we continue through Strawson's argument.
Strawson goes on to give two concepts which he sees as inherent to the
phenomena/noumena split—the concept of identity of reference and the
concept of the 'corrected view'. Strawson states,
"When it is said that a thing appears to be thus-and-so, but
really is not, it seems to be implied that there are two dif
ferent standpoints from which it would be natural to make
different and incompatible judgments about the same thing.
...The standpoints...must have something in common, so
that there is some way...of securingidentity of reference to
the thing which is judged."12
Strawson concludes from this, "...our sensible experience is the causal out
come of our being affected by the objects we say we perceive."13
Strawson is extremely reticent to give examples here to explain his
position, so I shall provide one of my own. Consider the classic example
of the stick that appears to be bent when half of it is immersed into water.
When the stick is observed to be bent, persons tend to apply Strawson's
first concept—the identity of reference. The observer must have in mind
two ideas. He or she has in mind, first, the idea of the 'original' stick. This
is the 'straight' stick. Then, the observer contemplates the 'second' stick.
It is 'bent'. (It seems inappropriate to say it 'appears' bent at this point.)
Now,the observer applies the concept of identity of reference. In doing so,
the observer claims that the first stick with its properties and the second
stick with its properties are actually the same stick. I grant that Strawson is
12 The Bounds ofSense, pp.250-251.
13 Ibid.
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correct insofar as his notion of the identity of reference does become ap
plied by human being all the time in 'common-sense'.
Now, Strawson combines the concept of identity of reference with the
concept of the corrected-view. On Strawson's account, the corrected-view
comes about when an observer has a privileged position to a particular
object of consciousness.14 It seems that this privilege couldoccur when
one person corrects another person or when one person corrects himself or
herself. Let usagain take the example ofthestick. It ispractically a rule of
common-sense to say that the stick is not really bent when it is in the water.
We purport the corrected-view. We say that the stick appears to be bent
when it is in fact not really bent.
Strawson proceeds toward his conclusion. He asks, what can be the
function that makes the corrected-view inlight ofthe fact that we allagree
that the thing observed is not the thing as it actually is? Strawson claims
that it must be intuition for Kant. Strawson states that the 'view' of the
object of the corrected-view is not a view at all. In a word, the corrected-
view is never strictly a view in the sense that it is never sensible.15 The
corrected-view can onlycomefrom a further synthetic judgment.
The question remains, howdo weknow thatour synthetic judgment is
veridical? In other words, how do persons arrive at the correct synthetic
judgment? For Strawson, theonly waythatpersonscan ever have veridical
experience is because appearances are caused by transcendental things.
Therecan be no absolute veridical knowledge without the appearance be
ingcaused bythething in itself. Otherwise, theappearance would be pure
phantom. There would be no certainty in our synthetic judgment that the
crooked stick is not a veridical experience. What would be the basis for
judging the crooked stick to be non-veridical? The answer is there would
be no basis for judging the crooked stick as illusion. Our judgments re
main capricious for Strawson without the causal agency of the thing in
itself.1*
Strawson argues that Kant is committed to having actual causal effi
cacy for the thing in itself. The thing in itself must be the cause of the
appearance, or the appearance is not grounded in anything. If the appear
ance is not grounded in anything, then veridical knowledge must be an
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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illusion.17
We proceed now to a defense of Kant and Kantian philosophy from
Strawson's attack. In doing so, one thing is certain: There must be an
accounting of Kant's statements which point to transcendental causality.
Some of them have been placed earlier in the paper, and there is no doubt
that any attack which takes Kant to task for making those statements must
be acceptable prima facie. That is to say that when Kant on the one hand
puts causality in the categories while, on the other hand stating that the
transcendental is somehow the cause of the phenomenal, a problem can
certainly be perceived. I will hold that this problem can be overcome,
however. To do this it will be imperative to look at two different senses of
causality.
Nicholas Rescher provides us with these two types of cause. First,
there is authentic causality. By authentic causality, Rescher means the
empirical causality which humans observe in the spatial-temporal realm.18
So, whenever persons engage in causal judgments—judgments such as
perceptions of a game of billiards where it is judged synthetically that the
fifteen ball caused the nine ball to move—personsare speaking of authen
tic causality. Rescher clearly states that this is the causality of which Kant
speaks in the Critique of Pure Reason when Kant speaks of causality as
only occurring as a result of synthesis through the category of 'cause and
effect'.
Rescher establishes the second type of causality as transcendental.
Rescher calls this "a not properly causal generic grounding."19 He holds
to the Kantian distinction between 'intelligibility' and 'knowability' by
stating that this grounding is intelligible and not knowable. Rescher goes
on to say, "The kinship between the two sorts of 'causality' is sufficiently
remote that the employment of the same terms—such as 'affecting'—in
both cases must be regarded as purely analogical."20
17 It seems that Strawson isguilty tocommitting himself totheCorrespondence Theory of
Truth. I will not comment on the denial of the Correspondence Theory of Truth that Kant
makes other than to say that Kant is correct in asserting that there would be no phenomenal
object in the first place (there would only be the thing in itself) if it were not for the human
subject. The Copernican Revolution in Philosophydefacto attacks the Correspondence
Theory of Truth decisively.
18 Nicholas Rescher. "Noumenal Causality." Proceedings of the Third International Kant
Congress, p.463.
19 "Noumenal Causality." p.463.
20 Ibid.
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To defend thisassertion that Kant merely usesthe idea of transcenden
tal causality in an analogical manner, Rescher quotes Kant21 atA206:
"...When I view all things not as phenomena butas things
in themselves and as objects of the mere understanding,
then despite their being substances they can be regarded,
in respect of their existence, as depending upon a foreign
cause. But our terms would then carry with them quite
other meanings, and would not apply to appearances as
possible objects of experience."22
First, we need to understand what Kant means when he asserts that he
views all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves. 'Thinghood',
for Kant, is only applicable here to the thing in itself. The very term 'ap
pearance' hints that such an object as the apparent object is lacking. What
it lacks is what the noumenon has; and that which the noumenon has is
'thinghood'. The phenomenon iswhat the human subject may know. How
ever, the phenomenon is not the ding-an-sich. The phenomenon is not
even a thingper se. At A492, Kant states, "...all appearances...are not in
themselves things; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist
outside our mind."23
This said, it is more evident asto what is happening atA206. Kant is
claiming that heis allowed to talk of noumena as depending ona foreign
cause. At the same time, Kant explicitly warns the reader that the reader
should notview the terminology reserved for the thing in itself in the same
manner thatthe reader should view the terminology reserved for phenom
enal objects. Otherwise, there will be confusion. This is the confusion
which results when a reader hastily regards noumenal causality and phe
nomenal causality as being identical in terms ofcausality. At A206, we are
cautioned against such a confusion.
This question remains: How are we readers of Kant supposed to jus
tify Kant's assertion that the noumenon has causal efficacy? We are left
this question because of A206and because of numerous other parts of the
Critique of Pure Reason which I have provided. All of these quotations
21 Ibid.
22Critique of Pure Reason. A206.
23Ibid., A492.
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point in the same direction. There has to be some way in which the
noumenon affects the human subject so that the human subject can do syn
thesis in order to experience the world. Furthermore, there has to be some
way in which the appearance comes to exist. How does that happen? If it
is strictly by alteration, then we are still left with the very problem which
has been troubling us. In what way do noumena affect phenomena?
Rescher claims that the answer to these problems comes directly from
the Principle of Sufficient Reason.24 Kant's own discussion of the Prin
ciple of Sufficient Reason in the Critique ofPure Reason is limited. How
ever, we do find that Kant defines it thus:
"The principle of [Sufficient Reason] is this properly...a
rule, prescribing a regress in the series of conditions of
given appearances, and forbidding [reason] from bringing
the regress to a close by treating anything at which [the
regress] may arrive as absolutely unconditioned."25
I take this definition of Kant's to be an explanation of how the phenom
enon is ever grounded by the noumenon. When Kant speaks of a series of
conditions for given appearances, what does he mean? An example of this
is as follows. First, we should gather an idea of some particular appear
ance. The appearance of a pen will do. Now, any pen will always be a
completely phenomenal object. Of course, it seems absurd that anyone
should speak of a transcendental pen. Now, since this pen is phenomenal,
it is, by definition, conditioned. The human subject has already made a
judgment about the world which he or she is experiencing. In this case, the
subject has made a seemingly veridical observation. He or she has encoun
tered a pen.
After this is done, the human subject is left to make any number of
judgments about the pen. According to the purposes of this paper, let us
look to one synthetic and categorical judgment that the subject can make—
the judgment of 'cause and effect'. The person will want to know how it is
that the pen arrives qua pen. Well, the pen has been empirically caused, we
say, by severalprocesses. The people who manufactured the pen take cer
tain materials like plastic,metal, and ink and then put them together in a
24 "Noumenal Causality." p.463.
25 Critique ofPure Reason. A508-A509.
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certain way. The materials of whichI speak are not noumenal in the least.
This is by definition, because we humans know thematerials by which the
object is made. So, our regress will continue past the phenomenal objects
which make thepen. We shall proceed past thephenomenal objects which
make the phenomenal objects (the material which makes material). The
regress will approach infinity.
Stopping the regress is precisely the function of the thing in itself. It
provides the ground to whichthe phenomenal objectis adherent. Without
this ground, persons would be forced into holding to nothing butphenom
ena. Of course,philosophic historyis richin this discussionofcauses,and
there are various views on the problems of causality as shown by infinite
regress. Kant's solution is that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is what
ends the infinite regress. This is precisely what Rescherhas in mind:
"A carefulheed of this perspective—and so of the distinc
tion between a generic Principleof Sufficient Reason and
a specific Principle of Causality—enables us to see how
Kant can be freed from the charge of inconsistency in re
gardto noumenal causality. The answeris simply that the
relationshipofthe thingin itself to thephenomenon is ac
tually not to be construed in causal terms at all. Want's
own occasional loosenessof formulation notwithstanding,
it is clear that while things in themselves somehow 'af
fect' the sensibility so as to bring representations of ob
jects into being,the relationship hereat issue is definitely
not be construed in properly causal terms. The linkage
between phenomenonandthing in itself, rather thanbeing
actually causal in character, is not mediated by the Prin
ciple of Causality at all, but by a more basic and general
Principle of Sufficient Reason. This principle is—I sub
mit—the (essentially) non-causal principle of grounding
to which Kant time and againmakes appeal. And—use of
activity-oriented language notwithstanding—an appeal to
actual causality is just not at issue here, any more than
when one says that 5 is 'produced' by the addition of 3 and
2."26
26 "Noumenal Causality." P.465.
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Rescher's assertion is this: The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the
Principle of Causality are strictly different notions but are analogically
similar notions. The cause and effect relationships that persons observe in
the world must adhere strictly with phenomena. This follows from the fact
that Kant has asserted that the synthetic judgments that persons make about
the world have to necessarily be done with phenomenal objects. This is the
case because there is no way in which appearances can be noumenal in
character. What is given to the person in the way of experience is already
given in space and time. The very setting for experience must necessarily
be phenomenal for Kant. However, to say that persons can apply the same
concept of the pure understanding or category to a thing in itself would be
to contradict the very fact that judgments of cause and effect must be syn
thetic judgments that are made about appearances.
Rescher's call to the Principle of Sufficient Reason tells the reader that
the thing in itself is such that it may provide the ground for the appearance.
I go so far as to say that it indeed could be the case that the thing in itself is
the cause of appearances. At the same time, the thing in itself may not be
the cause ofappearances. Wecannot know whether the thing in itselfis the
cause ofappearances. This follows from the fact that the thing in itself is
not knowable—it is only intelligible. The thing in itself makes appear
ances possible. However, we cannot know if it is the actual cause of ap
pearances.
There is only one problem with the entirety of the Rescherian position.
Rescher seems to claim that the phenomenon and the noumenon are in fact
two ontologically distinct entities. Rescher states, "If you are going to
claim genuinely objective knowledge, then you must also be prepared to
claim a genuine object whose existence at any rate is something indepen
dent of the conditions of thought."27 What is implied here is this. There
are two numerically distinct entities: the noumenon and the phenomenon.
The numerical distinction in the Rescherian position is ontological. I claim,
along with Baldner, that this ontological distinction is not necessary.28 The
appearance is truly only the object that is grounded on the thing in itself.
The appearance depends upon the thing in itself for its ontological status.
In fact, the ontological status of the phenomenon is zero without the
thing in itself. The proof of this contention is given thus: Kant has made
27 Ibid., 467.
28 Kent Baldner. "Causality and Things inThemselves." Synthese. No.77,1988, pp.354-
357.
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hisclaim that thething in itselfis theonly entity which hasa true claim to
the term thing. The appearance isonly derivable by the human subject by
way of the thing in itself. By the very fact that the appearance has an
ontological dependence on the thing initself, it follows that the appearance
ispossessive ofno ontological dependence without the thing initself. The
thing in itself isthe ultimate ontological entity for Kant. Even though it is
not knowable, it isstill the underlying 'x' that makes any experience atall
possible.
The truedifference between the phenomenon and the noumenon is not
ontological. It isepistemological. We can know thephenomenon, butwe
can only think the thing initself. The noumenon isnot knowable strictly
because we can never be privy tothe unconditioned being. Everything any
person knows must, bydefinition forKant, besuch thatit isphenomenal in
character. The noumenon is intelligible. It happens to be the ultimate
ontological entity, although human beings cannot know itbecause the very
possibility ofknowledge isgrounded onthe categories. The categories can
only provide for synthetic judgments on appearances, not things in them
selves. Other than on this point, I concurwithRescher's viewof transcen
dental causality.
In conclusion, I refer to otherphilosophers who have taken the same
interpretation on Kant's view of cause and effect. Most recently, Wayne
Waxman spoke of the supposed affective agency of things in themselves
while Waxman was looking at theSecond Analogy.2? Waxman, in a foot
note, states, "I can think of no justification consistent with constraints Kant
placed on the objective employment of the concept of causeand effect to
warrant his use of the manifestly causal notion 'affection' in reference to
things in themselves [in the Critique of Pure Reason.] w
Henry Allison has this to say about the problem. "...The problem has
been misconstrued.... As traditionally understood, the issue is whether the
affecting object is an appearance, a thing in itself, or perhaps both. This
formulation is based, at least tacitly, ontheassumption thatthedistinction
between appearances and things in themselves is between two kinds of
entity."31 I agree with Allison here. There arenottwokinds ofentityhere.
There is one entity with full ontological status—the thing in itself. The
appearance depends on the thing in itself for its ontological status.
29 "Kant's Analogies." p.97
30 Ibid.
3' Henry Allison. Kant's Transcendental Idealism, p.248.
KANT'S PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY 33
But for Allison, there is still a problem. Allison correctly states that
Kant speaks of objects which affect the mind. Are these references to ob
jects as appearances or as things in themselves?32 I contend that the only
objects that can be known to have any causal efficacy are appearances. It is
certainly intelligible that the thing in itself could be the cause of appear
ances, but we can have no knowledge of this according to Kant.
To support my point, I appeal to the examination of the Critique of
Pure Reason which Kant undertakes in the Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics. I locate the vital discussion of this problem in the Critique of
Pure Reason at Paragraph 28 of the Prolegomena:
"...I have no notion of such a connection of things in them
selves, how they can...act as causes If we should oc
cupy ourselves about the object in itself, there is not a single
possible attribute by which I could know that it is deter
mined under [this aspect],..of causc.for I have no con
cept of the possibility of such aconnection ofexistence."33
This is Kant's own address toward the apparent contradiction that occurs in
the Critique of Pure Reason. From this, I claim that Kant had already
anticipated the problem.
Responding to the skepticism ofDavid Hume was no easy chore. Hume
had sought to destroy the necessary connection of causality, and Hume
nearlydid destroy it. It was left to Immanuel Kant to save causality from
the fires of skepticism, and Kant performed brilliantly. What Kant had to
do is partand parcel with his Copernican Revolution in philosophy. Kant
had to take the Copernican turn and place 'cause and effect' directly in the
categories. In doing so, it was insured that necessary causality was not
something that adhered strictly in objects. Necessary causality for Kant
adheres neither in the transcendental object nor in the phenomenon. Judg
ments of necessary cause and effect relationships are, instead, a product of
human synthesis. Rational beings are able to take occurrences in the phe
nomenal realm and then make synthetic judgments about the appearances.
So, when a person watches a game of billiards, he or she is able to deter
mine the causal relations that billiard balls have between each other. The
billiard balls, as stated before, are phenomenal objects, and persons make
32Kant'sTranscendental Idealism, pp.248-249.
33Kant. Prolegomena toAny Future Metaphysics. The Carus translation. Paragraph28.
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judgments synthetically about the causes and effects ina game. Further
more, persons are able to agree with one another about causal events be
cause persons are allendowed with the same faculties ofintuition. Through
the intuition (which is the same for all persons) and the affinity of the sen
sible manifold, we can have aview ofcausality that isvalid for all persons.
There isno transcendental causality that is the same type ofcausality
as isgiven in the empirical relations ofphenomenal objects. This the gen
eral position ofthe Kantian doctrine as Kant saw itinthe Prolegomena and
as many contemporary philosophers see it.
The noumenal thing is merely the grounding for the phenomenal ob
ject. We need this grounding to establish the objectivity ofexperience.
Rescher is quite correct in stating this, but he does go too far in establishing
that the noumenon and the phenomenon should be ontologically distinct.
All that isnecessary isanepistemological distinctness between noumenon
and phenomenon. When noumenal causality is viewed as merely analogi
cal, then the problem of the apparent contradiction disappears. Humean
skepticism becomes refutable without contradiction.
Avery important consideration that has been ignored for the purposes
ofthis paper isthe idea ofthe person asboth phenomenon and noumenon.
Itis clear from Kant's discussion ofthis34 that ifwe are to deny intelligible
causal efficacy for the noumenal self, then we are denying that there can be
any practical freedom atall. Kant's discussion ofpractical freedom comes
in the Groundingfor the Metaphysics ofMorals, and, any important discus
sion ofthis notion of practical freedom is beyond the scope of this paper.
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